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In situations where the recognition heuristic exploits the pres-
ence of a particular information structure – namely, that recogni-
tion knowledge about natural environments is often systematic 
rather than random – to make good decisions, the recognition heu-
ristic is ecologically rational, exemplifying Herbert Simon’s vision 
of rationality as resulting from the close fit between the mind and 
the environment (Simon, 1990). One condition that should govern 
whether this strategy will be used is therefore whether the environ-
ment is appropriately structured (meaning, as we will define later, 
that there is a high recognition validity). When the environment is 
not appropriate for using the recognition heuristic, decision makers 
may ignore recognition, oppose recognition, or factor in informa-
tion beyond recognition, as discussed later in this article.
The exploitable relation between subjective recognition and 
some (not directly accessible) criterion results from a process by 
which the criterion influences object recognition through media-
tors, such as mentions in newspapers, on the Internet, on radio, 
on television, or by word of mouth. Specifically, objects with high 
criterion values tend to be mentioned more frequently in the news, 
frequent mentions increase the likelihood that their name will be 
recognized, and as a consequence, recognition becomes correlated 
with high criterion values (for empirical support, see Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer, 2002; Pachur and Hertwig, 2006; Pachur and Biele, 
2007; Scheibehenne and Bröder, 2007).
Our goal in this article is to summarize and to connect research 
on the recognition heuristic since Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 
2002) first specified it, carve out from empirical tests of the rec-
ognition heuristic boundary conditions of its use, and point to 
novel questions that have emerged from this research. We start 
IntroductIon
In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Final Problem, Sherlock Holmes 
finally faces his arch enemy, Professor Moriarty. In describing 
Moriarty to Watson, Holmes asks Watson, “You have probably never 
heard of Professor Moriarty?” “Never.” “Aye, there’s the genius and 
the wonder of the thing! The man pervades London, and no one 
has heard of him. That’s what puts him on a pinnacle in the records 
of crime.” Holmes thus implies that extraordinary things usually 
cannot avoid being heard of and thus being recognized by many 
people. It would be much less surprising for Watson to have never 
heard of Moriarty if Moriarty were insignificant. In other words, 
recognition may often (but not always) be useful because it can 
tell us something about the objects in question. Specifically, if we 
have heard of one object but not another, this can be an indication 
that the objects differ in other respects as well. Recognition would 
then allow us to make inferences about these other characteristics. 
To illustrate, imagine a culturally interested American tourist who, 
when planning her visit to Germany, needs to make a quick guess 
whether Heidelberg or Erlangen has more museums. Having heard 
of Heidelberg but not Erlangen, she could exploit her partial igno-
rance to make the (correct) inference that Heidelberg has more.
One strategy that uses recognition to make inferences from 
memory about the environment is what Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
(1999, 2002) called the recognition heuristic. For two-alternative 
choice tasks, where one has to decide which of two objects scores 
higher on a criterion, the heuristic can be stated as follows:
If one object is recognized, but not the other, then infer that the recog-
nized object has a higher value on the criterion.
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retrieve cue values for that object from memory, and in this sense 
recognition precedes retrieval of cues. Recognition therefore serves 
as an initial screening step (if it correlates with the criterion, as used 
in the take-the-best heuristic and others) that precedes the search 
for further cue information. The thesis that recognition gives rise to 
non-compensatory processing was given prominence by Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer (2002), who described the recognition heuristic as 
follows: “the recognition heuristic is a non-compensatory strategy: 
if one object is recognized and the other is not, then the inference 
is determined; no other information can reverse the choice deter-
mined by recognition” (p. 82). “Information” here means cue values, 
not criterion values; in contrast, when a solution can be derived 
from criterion knowledge, local mental models can be applied, and 
the recognition heuristic does not come into play. For this reason, 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) did not even discuss local mental 
models, because their focus was on uncertain inferences as made 
by the recognition heuristic.
How could such a mechanism that bases a decision solely on 
recognition and ignores other cue knowledge make good inferences? 
First, recognition seems to have a retrieval primacy compared to 
other cue knowledge (Pachur and Hertwig, 2006). Recognition 
information is available to make an inference earlier than other 
information and enables one to make a quick and effortless decision, 
which is clearly beneficial when time is of the essence. Second, in 
some situations, information beyond recognition does not allow one 
to discriminate between options. For instance, customers are often 
unable to distinguish the taste of different beers or other products 
once the labels have been removed (e.g., Allison and Uhl, 1964). As 
a consequence, information beyond name recognition, which would 
take more time and effort to gather and process, may sometimes sim-
ply be useless. Third, it has been shown that the non-compensatory 
use of recognition can lead to more accurate inferences than mecha-
nisms that integrate recognition with further cues (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein, 1996). One reason for this is that if what is known about 
a recognized object is a set of negative cue values, this can lead to the 
object’s unjustified rejection (recall that usually no knowledge can 
be retrieved for unrecognized objects). In a mathematical analysis 
of the recognition heuristic, Davis-Stober et al. (2010) identified 
conditions under which relying on one single cue (e.g., recogni-
tion) while ignoring further cue knowledge is actually the optimal 
strategy. The authors showed that as long as the cue is correlated 
with other cues, ignoring this further knowledge minimizes the 
maximal deviation from the cue weighting scheme that could be 
derived under perfect knowledge of the environment. Importantly, 
this result does not depend on the one cue being the most valid one.
Fourth, in important decision tasks during our evolutionary 
past, searching for information beyond recognition, even if it could 
be useful, may often have been dangerous. Take, for instance, forag-
ing for food. The cost of being poisoned by sampling from unrec-
ognized mushrooms was probably considerably higher than the 
cost of rejecting an unrecognized but harmless mushroom. As a 
consequence, an avoidance of searching for information beyond 
recognition could have evolved in some domains (Bullock and 
Todd, 1999). And some animals indeed often seem to choose food 
based on recognition and ignore other, potentially relevant infor-
mation. For instance, Galef et al. (1990) observed that Norway rats 
preferred food they recognized from smelling other rats’ breath over 
by describing and clarifying the basic characteristics and assump-
tions of the heuristic. For this purpose, we trace how the notion 
of the heuristic developed, and we locate recognition knowledge 
in relation to other knowledge about previous encounters with an 
object, such as the context of previous encounters, their frequency, 
and their ease of retrieval from memory (i.e., their fluency). Then 
we provide an overview of empirical evidence on two important 
issues: in what environments is the recognition heuristic ecologi-
cally rational? And do people follow recognition in these envi-
ronments? We then review evidence for two bold prediction of 
the recognition heuristic: first, that when recognition knowledge 
discriminates between two objects, further cues are ignored; and 
second, that recognizing fewer objects can lead to higher inferen-
tial accuracy (the less-is-more effect). We close with a discussion 
of recent connections of the recognition heuristic with memory 
models and highlight relations to other judgment phenomena 
influenced by a previous encounter with an object.
the FoundatIons and ImplIcatIons oF the 
recognItIon heurIstIc
the non-compensatory use oF recognItIon
The recognition heuristic makes a strong claim. It assumes that if 
people recognize one object but not the other, and there is a substan-
tial recognition validity, recognition is used in a non- compensatory 
fashion – that is, no other cues can reverse the judgment indicated 
by recognition (as elaborated below, the heuristic does not apply to 
situations in which people already have conclusive criterion knowl-
edge about the objects, which allows a response to be deduced). To 
appreciate this claim, let us trace the development of the notion of 
the recognition heuristic. In an early article that can be considered 
the basis for the fast-and-frugal heuristics program, Gigerenzer 
et al. (1991) discussed the potential role of recognition in making 
bets about unknown properties of the environment. When fac-
ing a task in which one has to decide which of two objects scores 
higher on some criterion (e.g., which of two soccer coaches has been 
more successful in the past), Gigerenzer et al. (1991) proposed that 
people first try to solve the problem by building and using a local 
mental model. A local mental model can be successfully constructed 
if (a) precise criterion values can be retrieved from memory for 
both objects, (b) intervals of possible criterion values for the two 
objects can be retrieved that do not overlap, or (c) elementary 
logical operations can compensate for missing knowledge. If no 
such local mental model can be constructed, people construct from 
declarative knowledge a probabilistic mental model (PMM). Such a 
model consists of probabilistic cues, that is, facts about an object 
that are correlated with the criterion for a clearly defined set of 
objects. In other words, a PMM connects the specific structure of 
the task with the probability structure of a corresponding natural 
environment (stored in long-term memory) and uses the proba-
bilistic cues to solve the problem by inductive inference. Subjective 
recognition of an object (which Gigerenzer et al. referred to as the 
“familiarity cue”) was held to be one such cue.
While Gigerenzer et al. (1991) assumed that recognition func-
tions similarly to objective cues (e.g., the cue that a city has an 
international airport), this view was later revised. Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein (1996) put forth the thesis that recognition holds a special 
status, because if an object is not recognized, it is not possible to 
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recognized object is judged to have the higher criterion value. The 
validity of object knowledge beyond recognition, which can be used 
to make a decision when both objects are recognized, knowledge 
validity β, is defined as the proportion of correct inferences among 
the cases where both objects are recognized.
The recognition and knowledge validities are defined relative 
to a reference class (Brunswik, 1943; Gigerenzer et al., 1991), which 
clearly specifies the population of objects that are to be judged (e.g., 
predicting the outcome of tennis matches at a Grand Slam tourna-
ment, or comparing the population sizes of the 50 largest British 
cities). To be able to make a reasonable prediction of whether people 
will use the recognition heuristic in a particular judgment task, it 
is necessary to know the reference class from which participants 
think the objects are drawn. Without a reference class, the recogni-
tion validity is not defined, and it is unclear how in this situation 
people might choose to use or suspend the heuristic. (The question 
of how of the recognition heuristic is selected is discussed in Low 
Recognition Validity and Discrediting Source Knowledge; see also 
Pachur and Hertwig, 2006).
the less-Is-more eFFect
The recognition heuristic can lead to a surprising phenomenon, 
in which less knowledge can lead to more accurate decisions. How 
is this possible? When no objects are recognized (and no other 
information can be gleaned from the name or image), a decision 
maker comparing all possible pairs of the objects can only guess 
which object has the greater criterion value. With an increasing 
number of recognized objects, there will be more and more pairs 
in which only one object is recognized, but also more cases in 
which both objects are recognized. The proportion of pairs with 
only one recognized object is highest when half of the objects are 
recognized and decreases again thereafter as a majority of objects 
are recognized. Now, under certain conditions, the expected accu-
racy of all resulting decisions (those made both with and without 
recognition) reaches a maximum when more than half, but fewer 
than all objects are recognized. When all objects are recognized, all 
choices have to be made based on knowledge beyond recognition, 
if available (because in this case the recognition heuristic is no 
longer applicable). Under those conditions, the accuracy of choices 
when all objects are recognized is lower than when at least some 
objects are not recognized and decision makers can benefit from 
the recognition heuristic’s greater accuracy in this environment.
What are these conditions under which less (knowledge) can be 
more (accurate)? Examining the recognition heuristic analytically, 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) showed that a less-is-more effect 
will emerge in a comparison task if (but not only if) the recognition 
validity (α) is higher than the knowledge validity (β), under the 
assumption that the validities are constant across different levels 
of the number of recognized objects, n (although they showed in 
computer simulations that the less-is-more effect can also occur 
when α is not constant). More recently, Pachur (2010) highlighted 
that the less-is-more effect is strongly reduced if people who rec-
ognize more objects also have a higher knowledge validity, that is, 
if n and the knowledge validity are positively correlated (see also 
Smithson, 2010). Finally, the less-is-more effect is also influenced 
by the quality of recognition memory. Specifically, if recognition 
memory is imperfect (i.e., if recognition does not always correctly 
food they did not recognize, irrespective of whether the other rat 
was ill (see Noble et al., 2001, for a model of how this ignoring of 
further information may have evolved).
As we will discuss in greater detail below, the proposal that rec-
ognition is used in a non-compensatory fashion has led to consider-
able protest in the literature, with the argument that such a model 
would be too simple to capture human decision making. Some 
of this protest was due to misunderstandings of the term “non-
compensatory.” Although Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) referred 
in their use of the term to the judgment and decision making lit-
erature (which precisely define what it means to say that a strategy 
is non-compensatory), the nuances of this definition were not clear 
to all readers [including one of the authors of this article (Lael J. 
Schooler)]. Oppenheimer (2003), for instance, argued that because 
people seem to make judgments against recognition when they have 
criterion knowledge contradicting it, the recognition heuristic is not 
descriptive of how people make decisions. Yet the term “compensa-
tory” refers to a trade-off between cue values, not between criterion 
values and cues such as recognition (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 
2011). Moreover, as mentioned before, having conclusive criterion 
knowledge is not a situation in which the recognition heuristic 
or any other inductive strategy is supposed to be used in the first 
place. In addition, Goldstein and Gigerenzer modeled inferences 
from memory in which unrecognized objects have unknown cue 
values. Cases in which objects are unrecognized but cue values are 
known (e.g., inspecting a new product in a grocery store) were not 
in the domain of the heuristic.
Moreover, the protest against the notion of a non-compensa-
tory use of recognition may appear surprising, given that non- 
compensatory choices are commonly observed. As the authors of 
one classic review of 45 process studies put it, “the results firmly 
demonstrate that non-compensatory strategies were the dominant 
mode used by decision makers” (Ford et al., 1989, p. 75). Perhaps 
more striking is that the predictions of another memory-based 
heuristic, availability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), are also non-
compensatory (based on just a single variable, e.g., speed of recall), 
but this seems to have bothered no one.
adaptIve use oF the recognItIon heurIstIc
Gigerenzer et al. (1999) assumed that the recognition heuristic is 
one of a set of strategies – the adaptive toolbox – that decision mak-
ers have at their disposal. One of the conditions in which the recog-
nition heuristic should be applied is when recognition is (strongly) 
correlated with the criterion. Conversely, when recognition is only a 
poor cue, the recognition heuristic should not be used (at least, if a 
better strategy exists). To quantify the accuracy achievable by using 
the recognition heuristic to make criterion comparisons among a 
class of objects (e.g., comparing the populations of Swedish cities), 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) proposed the recognition validity 
α. It is calculated as
α =
+
R
R W( )
,
where R and W equal the number of correct (right) and incor-
rect (wrong) inferences, respectively, that are made on all object 
pairs when one object is recognized and the other is not and the 
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of the availability heuristic retrieves instances of the target event 
categories, such as the number of people one knows who have 
cancer compared to the number of people who have suffered from 
a stroke (Hertwig et al., 2005). The recognition heuristic, by con-
trast, bases an inference simply on the ability (or lack thereof) to 
recognize the names of the event categories.
A recognition assessment, which feeds into the recognition 
heuristic, unfolds over time. The speed with which this recogni-
tion assessment is made – fluency – can itself be informative and 
can be used to infer other facts, for instance, how frequently an 
object has been encountered in the past1. The recognition heuristic 
does not draw on fluency information and only considers whether 
an object is recognized or not. The notion of inferences based on 
recognition speed, however, has been elaborated in the fluency 
heuristic (Schooler and Hertwig, 2005), which uses recognition 
speed to distinguish between two recognized objects (i.e., where 
the recognition heuristic does not apply) and lends computational 
precision to a long tradition of research on fluency (e.g., Jacoby 
and Dallas, 1981; Kelley and Jacoby, 1998; Oppenheimer, 2008).
Finally, collective recognition – the proportion of people in some 
population who recognize an object – has been used to examine the 
ecological rationality of the recognition heuristic. Collective recog-
nition has been found to be correlated with environmental quanti-
ties such as stock profitability (Borges et al., 1999; Ortmann et al., 
2008) and sports success (Serwe and Frings, 2006; Pachur and Biele, 
2007). Nevertheless, these tests are not direct implementations of 
the recognition heuristic, which models the use of individual rec-
ognition. Of course an individual could use collective recognition 
information (assuming he or she knows it) to make inferences 
about the world. However, the cognitive processes involved would 
be different from the recognition heuristic (e.g., including recall of 
the collective recognition rates or their estimation in other ways, 
such as by the number of people observed to have chosen some 
option – see Todd and Heuvelink, 2007).
To summarize, the recognition heuristic is a model of 
 memory-based inferences. It leads to good inferences in the real 
world if recognition is correlated with the criterion to be inferred. 
The heuristic is a precisely defined algorithm that gives rise to a 
number of specific predictions: first, recognition determines choices 
even when further cues on the recognized object speak against it (i.e., 
non-compensatory recognition use). Second, as the recognition heu-
ristic is assumed to be a tool in the mind’s adaptive toolbox, people 
should apply the heuristic if recognition is substantially correlated 
with the criterion, but not if recognition is not predictive. And third, 
the recognition heuristic can produce a less-is-more effect where less 
knowledge can lead to higher accuracy. Next we describe empirical 
tests of the assumptions and predictions that the heuristic makes. In 
Section “Ecological Analyses of Recognition,” we summarize studies 
that have examined the predictive power of recognition in the real 
world and discuss when and when not recognition is a good cue. 
In Section “The Recognition Heuristic as a Descriptive Model,” we 
turn to empirical tests of people’s use of the recognition heuristic. 
indicate whether an object has actually been encountered or not) a 
less-is-more effect can occur even if the recognition validity is not 
higher than the knowledge validity (Katsikopoulos, 2010).
InFormatIon about prevIous encounters: What recognItIon Is 
and Isn’t
The recognition heuristic uses information about previous 
encounters with an object. There are multiple dimensions of infor-
mation about such encounters that can be stored (e.g., frequency, 
context knowledge), and even characteristics of the process of 
retrieving this information can be exploited for an inference (e.g., 
the time required to recognize an object; Schooler and Hertwig, 
2005). The recognition heuristic uses only one of these various 
types of information: belief regarding whether or not an encoun-
ter occurred. But the term “recognition” has been applied in the 
literature to conceptually rather different things. Therefore, it is 
useful to clearly distinguish the information that the recognition 
heuristic employs from other forms of information about object 
encounters, and our intended meaning of the term recognition 
from other meanings.
First, “recognition” as Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) used 
it refers to the distinction “between the truly novel and the previ-
ously experienced” (p. 77). It thus differs from episodic recognition, 
which is commonly studied in research on recognition memory (cf. 
Pachur et al., 2009). In a typical recognition memory experiment, 
participants first study a list of items (usually existing words such 
as chair) and are later asked to go through a new list composed 
of previously studied plus unstudied items and pick out the ones 
that were on the original list. In other words, in these experiments 
typically none of the items are actually novel, because they are com-
monly used words. Therefore, the “mere” (or semantic) recognition 
that the recognition heuristic employs is insufficient to identify the 
correct items in this task, and knowledge about the context (i.e., 
episodic knowledge) in which the previously studied items were 
originally presented is required. The recognition heuristic does not 
require such episodic knowledge, because semantic recognition 
alone differentiates novel from previously encountered objects. 
Note that with novel objects, in this conception, no further cue 
knowledge can be available. Moreover, recognition in Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer’s sense is not independent of a reference class. A 
German participant may know that she has heard of Paris, France 
but not Paris, Tennessee (population 10,000), and not treat Paris as 
recognized on a test of US cities. In addition to recognition being 
sensitive to a person’s conception of the reference class, recognition 
validity, and even the decision to apply the recognition heuristic 
hinge on the reference class as well (see below).
A second important distinction is between (semantic) recog-
nition and frequency information, that is, knowledge about the 
number of times an object has been encountered in the past (e.g., 
Hintzman and Curran, 1994). The recognition heuristic does not 
distinguish between objects one has encountered 10 times and those 
encountered 60 times (as long as both are recognized or unrecog-
nized). This is one element that makes the recognition heuristic 
different from the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1973), which makes use of ease of retrieval or the quantity of 
recalled items (for a discussion of the different notions of avail-
ability see Hertwig et al., 2005). To make an inference, one version 
1Fluency could thus function as a proxy for frequency information, but there is also 
evidence that people use both types of information independently (e.g., Schwarz 
and Vaughn, 2002).
Pachur et al. Recognition heuristic
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science  July 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 147 | 4
Frings (2006) assessed how well the recognition heuristic was able to 
forecast the winners of the tennis matches at the 2003 Wimbledon 
tournament. This is a difficult problem: two Association of Tennis 
Professionals (ATP) rankings, that consider detailed accounts of the 
players’ past performance, predicted 66 and 68% of the matches cor-
rectly, and the seedings of the Wimbledon experts predicted 69%. 
Serwe and Frings (2006) asked German tennis amateurs to indicate 
which of the tournament players they recognized. Although some 
of the players that the amateurs recognized were no longer very suc-
cessful or were highly recognized primarily because they were also 
German, the recognition heuristic, using the individual recognition 
of players by the tennis amateurs, nonetheless correctly predicted 
73% of the matches in which it could be applied and collective rec-
ognition similarly predicted 72% (for a replication see Scheibehenne 
and Bröder, 2007). Extensive knowledge (such as the player rankings) 
produced fewer correct forecasts than systematic partial ignorance 
(i.e., partial recognition). As knowledge in many domains is limited 
and partial, just like that of the amateur tennis players, the recognition 
heuristic can be an efficient tool for decision making when recogni-
tion is correlated with a criterion in the real world.
Further analyses have confirmed the accuracy of recognition in 
the sports domain. In a study on forecasts of the matches of the 2004 
European Soccer Championship, Pachur and Biele (2007) asked 
laypeople which of the participating national teams they had heard 
of before. Using laypeople’s recognition, the authors then found that 
strictly following the recognition heuristic would have led, on aver-
age, to 71% correct forecasts. However, while this was significantly 
better than chance performance, the authors could not replicate 
the finding by Serwe and Frings (2006) that recognition enables 
better forecasts than expert information: Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA) rankings and rankings based on the 
previous performance of the teams achieved 85 and 89% correct 
forecasts, respectively. Finally, Snook and Cullen (2006) found in 
a study with Newfoundland students that their recognition led to 
an average of 85% correct judgments for the task of determining 
which of two National Hockey League (NHL) players had more 
career points.
In addition to sports, recognition has been shown to be useful 
in other competitive domains, such as political elections (Marewski 
et al., 2005), quality of US colleges (Hertwig and Todd, 2003), wealth 
of individual persons (Frosch et al., 2007), and performance of 
stocks (Borges et al., 1999; Ortmann et al., 2008; but see Boyd, 2001, 
for a possible restriction of that domain to rising stock markets). 
Thus, even in environments where objects can change their values 
on the criterion dimension rather quickly, recognition can prove to 
be a powerful predictor. Furthermore, forgetting can play a crucial 
role in maintaining an effective level of ignorance in such environ-
ments. To the degree that objects that objects with small criterion 
values are mentioned infrequently in the media and mention fre-
quency is correlated with the activation in memory, objects with 
small criterion values are also more likely to be forgotten (Schooler 
and Hertwig, 2005).
When Is recognItIon not a good predIctor?
Despite the apparent breadth of domains in which recognition can 
be exploited to infer a criterion, recognition, of course, does not 
predict everything. In which kinds of environments does it fail? 
We extract from the existing studies the boundary conditions of the 
recognition heuristic’s use, summarize evidence for the predicted 
non-compensatory use of recognition and the less-is-more effect.
ecologIcal analyses oF recognItIon
The recognition heuristic can be used as an ecologically rational 
tool from the mind’s adaptive toolbox in situations where recog-
nition is informative about a judgment to be made. Similarly, in 
problem solving (e.g., Simon, 1990) and in schema-based deci-
sion making (for an overview, see Goldstein and Weber, 1997) the 
assumption is made that recognition memory helps in quickly 
accessing knowledge structures that previously proved relevant 
in similar tasks. In what domains is recognition informative for 
making inferences – that is, where is it correlated with objective 
quantities? The degree to which recognition predicts a criterion in 
a given domain can be assessed in two ways. The first is to deter-
mine for a group of people their individual recognition validities 
α (based on their individual rates of recognizing the objects in a 
reference class) and then take the average recognition validities as an 
estimate of recognition’s predictive value (for a critical discussion, 
see Katsikopoulos, 2010). A second possibility is to use the recogni-
tion responses of the group to calculate the correlation between the 
objects’ collective recognition rates (defined as the proportion of 
people recognizing each object) and their criterion values, yielding 
the recognition correlation (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002). When 
deviations from a perfect association between recognition rates and 
the criterion are due to unsystematic error (i.e., when objects with 
higher criterion values are as likely to be unrecognized as objects 
with lower criterion values are likely to be recognized), the two 
measures are related as follows (Pachur, 2010):
α =
+1
2
rs ,
where r
s
 is the recognition correlation expressed as a Spearman 
rank correlation.
When Is recognItIon a good predIctor?
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) gave an initial overview of domains 
where recognition is a good predictor of particular criteria. Across 
a broad set of geographic domains, such as deserts, cities, lakes, 
and rivers, with criterion values corresponding to size or length, 
they found average recognition validities ranging between 0.64 and 
0.95. Since then, high recognition validities in geographic domains 
have been replicated repeatedly and across a number of different 
countries (e.g., Pohl, 2006; Pachur et al., 2008). For instance, in an 
analysis of the 50 largest cities of four European countries (Italy, 
France, England, and Spain), Pachur et al. (2008) found recognition 
validities between 0.72 and 0.78.
The criterion values of objects in geographic domains (e.g., river 
lengths, city sizes) are relatively stable and do not change much over 
time (or only rather slowly), often allowing an association between 
people’s recognition of the objects and the objects’ criterion values to 
arise. Surprisingly, however, recognition also seems to be a valid pre-
dictor in dynamic environments. One example for a dynamic envi-
ronment is sports, where new stars can rise quickly and previous ones 
remain well-known long after their peak performance. Serwe and 
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some measures of availability (Hertwig et al., 2005). Environmental 
analyses are a first step in understanding the ecological rationality of 
decision mechanisms that use any of these sources of information.
the recognItIon heurIstIc as a descrIptIve model
Whereas the previous section reviewed findings supporting the 
recognition heuristic as an ecologically rational inference tool, this 
section provides an overview of studies that have investigated how 
well the model predicts human behavior. The recognition heuristic 
has been tested in a wide variety of domains and situations, making 
it possible to map more systematically the conditions under which 
the heuristic describes behavior more or less accurately. We will start 
with evidence showing that, as predicted by the recognition heuris-
tic, many decisions align with recognition. This will be followed by a 
discussion of conditions under which people seem to systematically 
avoid basing their decisions on recognition. In the third and fourth 
parts of this section, we turn to tests of the recognition heuristic’s 
bold predictions of non-compensatory processing (i.e., that all other 
cues beyond recognition are ignored) and that less can be more.
When do people’s decIsIons FolloW recognItIon?
The recognition heuristic in inference tasks
In general, in domains where recognition is a good predictor (i.e., 
when the recognition validity α is high), a large proportion of 
people’s judgments in laboratory experiments are in line with the 
recognition heuristic’s predicted choices (typically around 90%). 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) observed that when American 
students were asked which of two German cities is larger (a domain 
for which Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, reported a recognition 
validity of 0.80) and they recognized one city but not the other, 
they picked the recognized one in 89% of the cases (and were con-
sequently correct 71% of the time). Similarly high rates of deci-
sions in line with recognition were found for Swiss, Belgian, Italian 
(Pohl, 2006), and British cities (Pachur et al., 2008), all of which 
are domains where the recognition validity is high. Pohl (2006; 
Experiment 4) found evidence for a frequent use of the recogni-
tion heuristic for other geographic materials, such as mountains, 
rivers, and islands.
In their application of the recognition heuristic to the sports 
domain, Snook and Cullen (2006) asked their participants to judge 
the relative number of career points achieved by different NHL 
players. As mentioned above, recognition is a highly useful piece 
of information for this task, and accordingly, a recognized player 
was chosen over an unrecognized one 95% of the time, even when 
participants had no further knowledge about the recognized player. 
This also led them to correct inferences 87% of the time.
The recognition heuristic in forecasting tasks
One objection to early tests of the recognition heuristic was that 
recognition knowledge might be confounded with criterion knowl-
edge in inference tasks (Oppenheimer, 2003). In forecasting, by 
contrast, where the task is to judge a criterion that lies in the future, 
one cannot know the criterion for certain, making it possible to 
test this objection. Subsequently, it has been shown for predicting 
tennis matches (Serwe and Frings, 2006; Scheibehenne and Bröder, 
2007), soccer games (Ayton and Önkal, 2004; Pachur and Biele, 
2007), and political elections (Marewski et al., 2005) that people 
First, recognition will not be correlated with criteria where people 
or the media talk about everything along the criterion dimension 
equally often (or equally rarely) or talk primarily about both ends 
of the dimension (e.g., very large and very small countries, or tiny 
and giant animals). In such cases more mentions of an object (and 
hence greater recognition) does not imply a high criterion value. 
To illustrate, Pohl (2006) found that the population of Swiss cit-
ies, but not their distance from the city Interlaken, is correlated 
with recognition. Correspondingly, he reported high reliance on 
the recognition heuristic when people were asked to judge which 
of two cities is larger, while when asked to judge which was closer 
to Interlaken, the reliance on recognition dropped to chance level.
Second (and relatedly), recognition does not seem to be a good 
predictor for criteria where the frequency of mentions in the media 
is driven by two (or more) factors that are themselves negatively 
correlated. Figure 1 illustrates this situation. For instance, frequent 
diseases are often discussed and written about because they can 
affect many people. At the same time, deadly or otherwise severe 
diseases are also often talked about – but severe diseases tend to be 
rather rare (Ewald, 1994). Mentions in the media and recognition 
of diseases are thus driven by factors that are negatively correlated 
(i.e., frequency of occurrence and severity). As a result, recogni-
tion is a relatively weak predictor of the frequency of occurrence 
of diseases: a recognized infectious disease is more common than 
an unrecognized one only about 60% of the time (Pachur and 
Hertwig, 2006). Similarly, for inferring the relative population size 
of animal species (a domain studied by Richter and Späth, 2006), 
recognition is unlikely to be a good predictor: while animal species 
with a large population (e.g., pigeons) are often well-known, so are 
endangered – and thus rare – species (e.g., pandas). Consistent with 
this ecological analysis, Richter and Späth (2006) reported little 
reliance on the recognition heuristic.
In sum, there is evidence that recognition is highly informative 
in many real-world domains and we are beginning to understand 
the conditions under which recognition is informative (though we 
do not have a complete theory of these conditions yet). Importantly, 
also other information extracted from previous encounters with 
objects in real-world domains seems to be informative and exploita-
ble for making inferences, such as fluency (Hertwig et al., 2008) and 
Figure 1 | Hypothetical plot for a task environment in which the 
recognition heuristic is not ecologically rational: predicting the frequency 
of diseases. Here, the number of mentions of a disease in the media (and thus 
its recognition) increases toward both extremes of the criterion dimension, for 
negatively correlated reasons (frequency vs. severity). As a consequence, 
recognition is uncorrelated with the criterion, and α is around 0.5.
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that Saarbrücken is the largest (or smallest) city in Germany and 
thus – by definition – larger (or smaller) than any other city; or 
if the subjective intervals of possible criterion values for the two 
objects do not overlap. Only then criterion knowledge is conclusive, 
obviating the need for a probabilistic mental tool such as the rec-
ognition heuristic. Accordingly, Hilbig et al. (2009) found that the 
mere availability of absolute and relative criterion knowledge has 
no or only a weak influence on the use of the recognition heuristic.
Unknown reference class
Mixing real objects with fictitious ones in an experiment or using 
objects from an amalgam of reference classes makes it impossi-
ble to calculate the recognition validity and thus difficult to pre-
dict whether people will use the recognition heuristic or not. For 
instance, Pohl (2006; Experiment 2) used a mixed set consisting of 
the 20 largest Swiss cities and 20 well-known but small ski resort 
towns. Whereas recognition is usually highly correlated with city 
size, the recognition of ski resorts is mainly driven by factors other 
than the size of the city (e.g., skiing conditions), so recognition 
will be useful for the set of large cities, but not for the ski resorts. 
Consequently, decisions in this mixed set followed recognition 
considerably less frequently than in Pohl’s Experiment 1 using a 
consistent set of large cities (75 vs. 89%).
Similarly, people may adopt strategies based on whether they 
believe that they are dealing with a representative or a biased sample 
of items. For instance, in addition to Oppenheimer’s (2003; see also 
McCloy et al., 2010; Experiment 1) tests of fictional cities being 
compared to recognized small towns near Palo Alto, other tests 
compared the fictional cities to places known for specific reasons, 
such as Nantucket (in a limerick), Chernobyl (nuclear disaster), 
or Timbuktu (in an expression). Since a reference class was not 
provided, and because it is hard to think of a natural reference 
class from which places like these would constitute a representative 
sample, participants may correctly infer that recognition is not valid 
in this artificial environment. In a clearly manipulated environ-
ment, such as that of trick questions, recognition validity may be 
undefined. Unable to assess the ecological validity of the recognition 
heuristic, it is only sensible for people to elect alternative strategies.
Low recognition validity
The key condition for the adaptive use of the recognition heuristic 
is its ecological rationality, when recognition accurately predicts 
the criterion in a given environment. Figure 2 shows a summary 
of 11 tests of the recognition heuristic in different domains. As 
can be seen, people seem to follow recognition considerably less 
in domains where the recognition validity is very low (Pachur 
and Hertwig, 2006; Pohl, 2006). In fact, the average proportion 
of choices in line with recognition was highly correlated with the 
average recognition validity in the respective domain, r = 0.64 
(p = 0.03) – indicating an adaptive use of the recognition heuris-
tic. These results suggest that the overall recognition validity in a 
particular domain is an important factor for whether the heuristic 
is applied or not2.
choose a recognized object over an unrecognized one even when 
making forecasts (around 80–90% of the time). Similarly, though 
not a direct test of the recognition heuristic, Weber et al. (2005) 
found that name recognition of a stock was associated with less 
perceived future riskiness, which, in turn, led to a higher tendency 
to decide to invest in the stock.
When do people not FolloW recognItIon?
The evidence just reviewed suggests that in particular environments 
people might exploit the fact that they have heard of one object but 
not another to infer further differences between the objects. Yet an 
adaptive use of the recognition heuristic also requires that people 
do not always follow recognition. We now consider characteristics 
of task environments that make them inappropriate for the appli-
cation of the recognition heuristic and ask whether people tend to 
suspend the use of the heuristic in those cases.
Conclusive criterion knowledge
As pointed out earlier, the recognition heuristic has been proposed 
as a mental tool for uncertain inferences (i.e., when no local mental 
model can be constructed). A study by Pachur and Hertwig (2006; 
Study 2) suggests that, indeed, people do not use recognition infor-
mation when they can construct a local mental model. When asked 
to judge which of two infectious diseases occurs more frequently, 
participants systematically chose the unrecognized disease when 
they knew that the recognized disease was practically eradicated 
– in other words, when they had conclusive criterion knowledge, 
which allowed them to locate the recognized object at the extreme 
low end of the criterion dimension. To illustrate, most participants 
recognized leprosy and knew that leprosy is nearly eradicated. This 
conclusive criterion knowledge allowed them to use a local mental 
model to deduce that leprosy is unlikely to be the more frequent of 
a pair of diseases. Accordingly, when leprosy was compared with 
an unrecognized disease, participants judged that the unrecognized 
disease was more frequent in 85% of the cases.
People’s ability to construct a local mental model based on 
conclusive criterion knowledge is also likely an explanation for 
the results in Oppenheimer (2003; Experiment 1). He presented 
Stanford students with decision tasks comparing the popula-
tion sizes of nearby cities that were highly recognized but rather 
small (e.g., Sausalito) with fictitious cities (a diverse set of ficti-
tious names: Al Ahbahib, Gohaiza, Heingjing, Las Besas, Papayito, 
Rhavadran, Rio Del Sol, Schretzburg, Svatlanov, and Weingshe). In 
deciding which city was larger, participants chose the recognized 
city in only 37% of the cases. Participants presumably knew that the 
nearby cities were very small (Sausalito has around 7,000 inhabit-
ants) and inferred that the unrecognized foreign cities may be larger.
Importantly, note that the mere availability of criterion knowl-
edge is insufficient to construct a local mental model. Rather, the 
criterion knowledge must be conclusive – that is, enable the decision 
maker to deduce a solution. For instance, knowing that Saarbrücken 
has a population of 190,000 (absolute criterion knowledge) or that 
it is the 43rd largest city in Germany (relative criterion knowledge) 
does not allow one to construct a local mental model and derive that 
Saarbrücken must be larger (or smaller) than an unrecognized city 
(for which no criterion knowledge can be retrieved). As described 
above, a local mental model can only be derived if one believes 
2Some results, however, suggest that people only decide not to follow recognition in 
domains with low recognition validity when they have alternative knowledge avai-
lable that has a higher validity than recognition (Pachur and Biele, 2007; Hertwig 
et al., 2008).
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 Discrediting source knowledge
According to Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), the rationale for the 
recognition heuristic’s ecological rationality is the natural media-
tion process through which a distal criterion variable (e.g., the size 
of a city) increases the likelihood that the object is talked about, 
which, in turn, increases the likelihood that the object is recog-
nized. Under these conditions, one can “exploit the structure of the 
information in natural environments” (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 
2002, p. 76). When recognition is due to an experimental manipula-
tion, that is, when people recognize an object from the experiment 
they are in, this natural mediation process is disrupted and peo-
ple might use recognition differently, or not use it at all. The fact 
that source knowledge affects inferences has already been shown 
for other assessments of memory: when people believe that their 
memory has been manipulated experimentally or know that it is 
affected by factors that are completely unrelated to the criterion 
dimension, they rely considerably less on fluency (Jacoby et al., 
1989; Hertwig et al., 2008) or ease of retrieval (e.g., Schwarz et al., 
1991; Oppenheimer, 2004).
There is some indication that this is also the case for recog-
nition. Specifically, decisions in accordance with recognition are 
considerably reduced when participants can attribute their sense 
of recognition to the experimental procedure (Newell and Shanks, 
2004; Bröder and Eichler, 2006; see discussion by Pachur et al., 
2008). Furthermore, knowledge that an object is recognized for 
a reason that has nothing to do with the object’s criterion value 
may reduce the reliance on recognition. As mentioned above, 
Oppenheimer (2003; Experiment 2) found that only around 30% 
of participants chose the recognized object when comparing cit-
ies such as Chernobyl and Timbuktu to unrecognized fictional 
ones. In addition to the fact that the reference class is undefined 
for fictional objects (see above), this finding might also be due to 
people’s knowledge that the recognized city was known because 
of a nuclear disaster or a popular limerick rather than due to its 
size. In sum, people may consider available knowledge about the 
source of their recognition that indicates its validity for a given 
decision when they decide whether to follow the recognition heu-
ristic or not.
Assessing the validity of recognition based on whether one has 
specific source knowledge might itself be done heuristically (cf. 
Johnson et al., 1993). Specifically, one might infer simply from 
one’s ability to retrieve specific knowledge about the source of an 
object’s recognition – for instance, that a city is recognized from a 
friend’s description of a trip – that recognition is an unreliable cue 
in this case. Why? One indication that recognition is a potentially 
valid predictor is when an object is recognized after encountering 
it multiple times in many different contexts (e.g., hearing a name 
in several conversations with different people, or across various 
media), rather than through one particular, possibly biased source. 
Thus, easily thinking of one particular source could indicate unreli-
ability, while difficulty in retrieving detailed information concern-
ing a particular context in which an object was encountered could 
indicate that recognition has been produced by multiple sources 
and is therefore an ecologically valid cue. Relatedly, if an object has 
appeared in many different contexts, retrieving information about 
any specific context is associated with longer response times than 
when an object has appeared in only one particular context (known 
However, both Pohl (2006; Experiments 1 and 4, but see 
Experiment 2) and Pachur and Hertwig (2006) found that, looking 
across participants in the same domain, participants did not seem 
to match their reliance on recognition directly to their individual 
recognition validity for that domain. Specifically, the individual pro-
portions of choices in line with the heuristic were not correlated with 
the individual α. This interesting result along with the correlation 
depicted in Figure 2 suggests that people know about validity dif-
ferences between environments, but not necessarily about the exact 
validity of their own recognition knowledge in particular environ-
ments. Supporting this conclusion, Pachur et al. (2008) found that 
although the mean of participants’ estimates of the validity of their 
own recognition knowledge (to predict the size of British cities) 
matched the mean of their actual recognition validities perfectly 
(0.71 for both), the individual estimates and recognition validities 
were uncorrelated (r = −0.03).
Framing
Another factor that seems to influence the use of the recognition 
heuristic is the way the inference problem is posed. In a set of stud-
ies, McCloy et al. (2010) and Hilbig et al. (2010b) compared the 
use of recognition in different framings of a judgment task (i.e., 
“Which object is larger?” vs. “Which object is smaller?”). As it turned 
out, participants chose the option predicted by the recognition 
heuristic less often when the task was to pick the object with the 
lower criterion value than when the task was to pick the one with 
the higher criterion value. Moreover, Hilbig et al. (2010b) found 
that participants required more time with the former than with 
the latter framing. There is some evidence that these asymmetries 
are mediated by differences in the perceived predictive value of 
recognition. In McCloy et al.’s (2010) study, participants rated it 
as more likely that they would recognize an object because it has a 
high criterion value than that they would not recognize an object 
because it has a small criterion value.
Figure 2 | Association between recognition validity in 11 different 
environments and the observed proportion of inferences following the 
recognition heuristic.
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to which people tend to follow recognition more when it leads to 
a correct inference than when it leads to an incorrect inference 
(for a very similar approach, see Hilbig and Pohl, 2008). Because 
according to the recognition heuristic no further cue knowledge 
is considered, d′ should be zero. Usually, however, d′ is found to 
be clearly larger than zero (for instance, Pachur et al., 2009, report 
values between 0.34 and 1.1), indicating that at least some peo-
ple consider additional knowledge (although this might partly be 
conclusive criterion knowledge; Pachur and Hertwig, 2006; Pachur 
et al., 2009). More recently, Hilbig et al. (2010a) developed a formal 
measurement model (using a multinomial tree) that allows measur-
ing the probability with which people ignore knowledge beyond 
recognition. Applying this model to several data sets, they found 
that people mostly use recognition in a non-compensatory way 
(between 62 and 76% of the time), but sometimes recruit strategies 
other than the recognition heuristic – strategies that do not strictly 
ignore additional knowledge.
Experimental manipulation of additional cue knowledge
The paradigm most frequently used for testing the  non- compensatory 
use of recognition is to train participants on additional cue knowl-
edge for some objects that he or she already recognizes prior to 
the experiment (e.g., typically cues that indicate that those objects 
have a small criterion value). If a person relies on the recognition 
heuristic and hence uses recognition in a non-compensatory way, 
this new knowledge beyond recognition will not affect the degree to 
which inferences follow recognition. That is, the recognized object 
should be chosen irrespective of whether the additional cue knowl-
edge indicates that the object has a high or a low criterion value. 
But do people’s choices conform to this prediction?
An experiment by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) suggests 
that they do. The authors informed their US participants that in 
about 78% of cases, German cities that have a soccer team in the 
Premier League are larger than cities that do not. In addition, par-
ticipants learned whether certain recognized cities had a soccer 
team. When later asked to pick the larger of two German cities, 
participants chose a recognized city over an unrecognized city in 
92% of all cases even when they had learned that the recognized 
city had no soccer team and the additional cue information thus 
contradicted recognition.
Richter and Späth (2006), Newell and Fernandez (2006; 
Experiment 1), and Pachur et al. (2008) conducted experiments 
that are direct extensions of Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) 
original study. Participants learned new information about objects 
that contradicted recognition (e.g., the additional learned cue 
indicated that the recognized city was small). Richter and Späth 
(2006; Experiment 3) asked their participants to judge the relative 
size of American cities in 190 pairs, replacing the soccer cue used 
in Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s study with whether the city has an 
international airport. Without the contradictory airport cue, 17 
of 28 participants followed the recognition heuristic with zero or 
one exception in the 32 relevant decisions, and 95% (median 97%) 
of the judgments across all participants followed the recognition 
heuristic – see Figure 3. When the airport cue contradicted recog-
nition, still 17 of 28 participants made the inferences predicted by 
the recognition heuristic: 9 exclusively and 8 all but once (i.e., 31 
out of 32 times). The median percentage of judgments in line with 
as the “fan effect” – Anderson, 1974). In other words, the fluency 
of retrieving a specific source might indicate whether recognition 
is based on a (single) biased source or not.
Given the evidence that people systematically employ the recog-
nition heuristic in some classes of environments and not others, its 
use seems to involve (at least) two distinct processes. One is judg-
ing whether an object is recognized or not; the other is assessing 
whether recognition is a useful indicator in the given judgment 
task. A brain imaging study by Volz et al. (2006) obtained evidence 
for the neural basis of these two processes. When a decision could 
be made based on recognition, there was activation in the medial 
parietal cortex, attributed to contributions of recognition memory. 
In addition, there were independent changes in activation in the 
anterior frontomedial cortex (aFMC), a brain area involved in 
evaluating internal states, including self-referential processes and 
social-cognitive judgments (e.g., relating an aspect of the external 
world to oneself). The processes underlying this latter activation 
may be associated with evaluating whether recognition is a useful 
cue in the current judgment situation. Importantly, there is evi-
dence that this evaluation occurs after the recognition judgment, 
or takes more cognitive resources. As Pachur and Hertwig (2006) 
showed, fast inferences are more likely to follow recognition than 
slow inferences (in an environment with low recognition validity). 
Similarly, compared to young adults older adults have a reduced 
ability to discriminate between cases where recognition is useful 
and where not, and this age difference is mediated by old adults’ 
reduced cognitive capacity (Pachur et al., 2009).
does recognItIon gIve rIse to non-compensatory processIng?
We now review studies that have tested the most controversial pre-
diction of the recognition heuristic – that recognition is used in a 
non-compensatory manner (i.e., that all other uncertain cues are 
ignored)3. Importantly, the mere observation that people often pick 
a recognized object is not very diagnostic in this regard, as additional 
cues are often correlated with recognition and a consideration of 
this knowledge could thus lead to the same prediction as a non-
compensatory mechanism based on recognition (e.g., Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein, 1996; Hilbig and Pohl, 2008). Moreover, people may 
deviate from choosing the recognized object in every case due to 
errors in applying the recognition heuristic. Several approaches 
have therefore been developed to obviate this problem: developing 
measures of additional knowledge use, manipulating additional 
cue knowledge experimentally, and making model comparisons 
(for a discussion, see Pachur, in press). We will discuss these three 
approaches separately and summarize the main findings of each.
Measures of additional knowledge use
Several authors have developed measures that reflect whether 
knowledge beyond recognition is used. Based on the signal detec-
tion theory framework, Pachur and Hertwig (2006; see also Pachur 
et al., 2009) proposed to use a d′ index which expresses the degree 
3We focus on studies that have examined inferences from memory, the context 
for which fast-and-frugal heuristics were originally proposed. Other experiments 
in which recognition “knowledge” was given to people along with other cues on a 
computer screen in an inferences-from-givens setup are not appropriate tests of this 
predicted non-compensatory use of recognition (e.g., Newell and Shanks’s, 2004, 
study, in which participants were told that they recognized an imaginary company).
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participants picked the recognized city was, overall, smaller when 
participants had learned the additional soccer team cue for that 
city that contradicted recognition (than when the cue supported 
recognition: 64 vs. 98%), and also smaller when the probability that 
an unrecognized city had a soccer team was high (than when the 
probability was low: 77 vs. 86%). However, as in Richter and Späth’s 
(2006) Experiment 3, the group means mask individual differences: 
overall, 23% of participants always chose the recognized city, irre-
spective of contradicting cue information (see Pachur et al., 2008).
In the studies of Richter and Späth (2006; Experiment 2) and 
Pachur et al. (2008), recognition was contradicted by not just one, 
but by up to three cues4. Would choices still follow recognition in 
this situation, as predicted by the recognition heuristic? Pachur 
et al. (2008), whose participants were taught up to three additional 
cues about British cities and subsequently asked to judge the cities’ 
relative sizes, observed higher proportions of participants ignoring 
further cue knowledge than using it: between 48 and 60% of their 
participants picked the recognized city with zero exceptions. That 
is, a large proportion of participants followed the choice indicated 
by recognition even when it was contradicted by three additional 
cues (for similar results, see Richter and Späth, 2006, as reana-
lyzed in Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). Importantly, this occurred 
although most participants perceived several of the other cues as 
having a higher validity than recognition.
In summary, while some analyses on the aggregate level appear 
to suggest that recognition is processed in a compensatory fashion – 
inconsistent with the recognition heuristic – analyzing individual 
decision makers show, however, that the recognition heuristic often 
captures the decisions of a large proportion of people. Thus, aggre-
gate analyses can hide important individual differences. Still, the 
results also indicate that some people do rely on different strate-
gies, either compensatory or non-compensatory ones. How well 
does the recognition heuristic compare to alternative strategies in 
describing people’s inferences?
Model comparisons
Whereas tests of the recognition heuristic have mainly focused on 
qualitative predictions of the heuristic without pitting it against 
other models (but see Pachur and Biele, 2007), Marewski et al. 
(2010) compared the recognition heuristic with several alternative 
models – both compensatory and non-compensatory ones. Such 
competitive tests are important because, as a model always has 
to make simplifying assumptions, its predictions will necessarily 
deviate from reality. Therefore, showing that data deviate from a 
model’s prediction does not necessarily make the model irrelevant 
(Pachur, in press). Instead, the model remains useful as long as no 
other model is better able to account for the data. As it turned out 
from Marewski et al. (2010) comparison, none of the alternative 
strategies, covering a large range of different processes, was able 
to outperform the recognition heuristic. In other words, although 
people sometimes cannot help but notice cues beyond recogni-
tion, they do not seem to do this as systematically as predicted by 
compensatory strategies.
the recognition heuristic remained unchanged at 97%. The mean 
dropped to 82%, but as Figure 3 shows, this does not mean that all 
individuals decreased in recognition heuristic adherence. Group 
means mask individual strategy selection (for similar results, see 
Figure 5 in Pachur et al., 2008). If we define a change as increasing 
or decreasing adherence by more than 1 in 32 questions, then even 
when facing contradictory information 43% of participants did not 
change, 39% conformed to the recognition heuristic less often, and 
18% conformed more often. While individual differences can be 
clearly seen, only 4 of 28 participants did not follow the recognition 
heuristic in the majority of judgments, and no participant adopted 
an anti-recognition strategy.
Newell and Fernandez (2006) manipulated knowledge of the 
probability that an unrecognized city had a soccer team (which 
would indicate that the city is large) and subsequently asked par-
ticipants to judge the relative size of these and other, unrecognized 
cities. If recognition were used in a non-compensatory manner, 
participants’ additional knowledge about whether a city has a 
soccer team should not affect their judgments. On the aggregate 
level, however, it did. The mean percentage of judgments where 
Figure 3 | reanalysis of richter and Späth’s (2006) experiment 3 based 
on individual data on use of recognition heuristic. The task was to infer 
which of two US cities has the larger population. (A) Shows the percentage of 
times each participant used the recognition heuristic when no contradicting 
cues were provided for the recognized city (with participants ordered left to 
right by amount of use). (B) Shows the same when participants learned that 
the recognized city does not have an international airport. Even when 
participants learned a valid cue that contradicted the recognition heuristic, a 
majority (17 of 28) made inferences consistent with the recognition heuristic 
with zero or one exceptions out of 32 decisions. (We are grateful to Richter 
and Späth (2006) for providing their individual data.)
4The experiment by Bröder and Eichler (2006) followed a similar methodology 
but involved experimentally induced rather than natural recognition and so is not 
 discussed here.
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that have not yet been identified. Currently we know little of the 
conditions under which this switch occurs and how systematically 
it happens; it is therefore unclear how these empirical violations of 
the recognition heuristic should be modeled. Also important, we 
need to better understand the evaluation processes preceding the 
heuristic’s use and the reasons for the individual differences in the 
use of the heuristic (Pachur and Hertwig, 2006; Pachur, in press).
connectIng the recognItIon heurIstIc to memory 
models
In their model of the recognition heuristic Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
(2002) focused on describing how information is searched for and 
when this search is stopped. They did not provide a model for the 
process underlying the recognition judgment itself. Some authors 
have criticized this omission (e.g., Dougherty et al., 2008). And 
indeed, subsequent developments have, by combining models of 
recognition-based inference with models of memory, given rise to 
new predictions of recognition-based inference that result from 
the processes of recognition memory. For instance, implementing 
the recognition heuristic within the ACT-R architecture (Anderson 
et al., 2004), Schooler and Hertwig (2005) have shown that the less-
is-more effect can arise through forgetting. Specifically, if an object’s 
criterion values is linked to mention frequency in the environment, 
which in turn influences activation in memory, small objects are 
more likely to decay in activation and thus become unrecognized 
than large objects. As a result of this systematic pattern in forget-
ting, memory decay can increase the recognition validity. In further 
ACT-R analyses, Marewski and Schooler (in press) show that the 
recognition heuristic is most likely to produce accurate inferences 
when knowledge is available about the recognized object.
A second example is Dougherty et al.’s (2008) work on the recogni-
tion heuristic using Hintzman’s MINERVA model (see also Pachur, 
2010). In computer simulations, the authors identified alternative 
accounts for the less-is-more effect and demonstrated that the effect 
can also occur if inferences are based on a mechanism using continu-
ous familiarity. Third, Erdfelder et al. (2011) connected the recogni-
tion heuristic with a two-high-threshold memory model, that also 
accounts for the process underlying the recognition judgment. The 
authors showed that this combined model can explain response time 
patterns that Hilbig and Pohl (2009) interpreted as evidence for a 
compensatory use of recognition. Finally, using a signal detection 
theory framework several authors have analyzed the implications of 
specific performance patterns in recognition memory (i.e., hit and 
false alarm rates) for the accuracy of the recognition heuristic (Pleskac, 
2007; Katsikopoulos, 2010). For instance, extending Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer’s (2002) original analyses of the less-is-more effect for the 
case of imperfect memory, Katsikopoulos (2010) showed that for the 
less-is-more effect to occur the recognition validity does not need to 
be larger than the knowledge validity.
related Judgment phenomena based on memory oF 
prevIous encounters
In this final section, we connect the recognition heuristic to sev-
eral classical phenomena (such as the reiteration effect and the 
mere exposure effect) in judgment research that also describe how 
memory of past exposure to objects can be exploited to make infer-
ences about unknown aspects of the environment. What is different 
An important insight emerging from empirical tests of the rec-
ognition heuristic is that we need to better understand individual 
differences in strategy use. Pachur et al. (2009) studied individual 
differences in how recognition is used by comparing decision mak-
ing by younger and older adults, whose cognitive systems usually 
differ in ways potentially relevant for the use of recognition. As 
mentioned above, due to their reduced cognitive resources old 
adults have a constrained ability to judge whether recognition is 
useful for a given task or not – and thus are limited in their adaptive 
use of recognition. Such age-comparative studies on fast-and-frugal 
heuristics have begun to provide intriguing results concerning the 
adaptive use of these heuristics and their role in older adults’ deci-
sion making (e.g., Mata et al., 2007).
the less-Is-more eFFect
Finally, what is the state of evidence for the less-is-more effect 
predicted (under specific conditions) by the recognition heuristic? 
Several demonstrations have shown that having heard of a larger 
number of objects is sometimes associated with lower inferential 
accuracy, both for individual decision makers (e.g., Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, 2002) and groups (Reimer and Katsikopoulos, 2004). 
However, reviewing 10 data sets where the recognition validity was 
larger than the knowledge validity – one of the conditions for the 
effect highlighted by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) – Pachur 
(2010) concluded that the evidence for the effect is mixed. Some 
have argued that the absence of the less-is-more effect provides 
evidence against people’s use of the recognition heuristic (e.g., 
Hilbig et al., 2010a). However, Pachur (2010) also found that in 
many data sets, recognition and knowledge validities are correlated 
with the number of recognized objects, violating the condition 
in Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s analysis that α and β are constant 
across the number of recognized objects. Via computer simulations 
Pachur showed how the correlation of the recognition validity and 
the knowledge validity on the number of recognized objects affects 
the predicted existence and size of the less-is-more effect. In other 
words, although the recognition heuristic can lead to a less-is-more 
effect under certain conditions, some of these conditions seem to 
be rather uncommon in the real world. As a consequence, clear 
manifestations of the less-is-more effect may be difficult to find, 
even if people often use the recognition heuristic.
summary
The recognition heuristic offers a parsimonious model of how rec-
ognition is exploited in inferences from memory. Experimental tests 
have shown that this simple model captures several key empirical 
findings, such as the often dominating impact of recognition on 
decisions, the contingent nature of the reliance on recognition, 
and the counterintuitive result that limited knowledge can outwit 
extensive knowledge. Nevertheless, the model cannot explain every 
single judgment. Studies that tested the extreme hypothesis that 
people would rely on the recognition heuristic in 100 or 99.2% 
of the cases they face (e.g., Hilbig et al., 2010a) have concluded 
that many people violate such a pattern and appear to recruit cue 
knowledge beyond recognition. Such deviations from recognition 
heuristic use may suggest an adaptive deployment of the heuristic 
in some occasions that is sensitive to factors beyond the recogni-
tion validity in an environment, and a switch to other strategies 
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whether one has heard of an object also used for estimation? Results 
by Brown (2002), who studied people’s estimations of dates of events 
and country sizes, suggest that they do5. Specifically, participants 
estimated unrecognized events as occurring a rather long time ago 
and unfamiliar countries as having rather small populations. People 
thus seem to take their ignorance as useful information for where to 
locate an object on a quantitative dimension even in absolute estima-
tion. Compared to the recognition heuristic, the processes involved in 
estimation are probably more complex, using metric and distribution 
knowledge to convert ignorance into a quantitative estimate. Lee and 
Brown (2004) proposed a model describing how people make date 
estimates of unknown events by combining the fact that they are not 
recognized with other information provided by the task.
preFerence and ascrIptIon oF posItIve meanIng
So far we have looked at recognition-based inferences about objec-
tive characteristics of the environment. What about the effects of 
previous encounters on preferences, for which there is no  objective 
criterion? As shown in the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968), 
repeatedly encountering an object results in an increased liking 
or preference for the object. In addition, objects such as symbols 
are generally ascribed a more positive meaning the more often 
they have been encountered. This indicates that memory traces of 
previous encounters are also used for constructing one’s affective 
responses to the environment. However, it is important to stress that 
in contrast to the recognition heuristic, these effects do not require 
that the object is recognized as having been seen before. Hence, the 
recognition heuristic cannot account for the mere exposure effect. 
The fluency heuristic (Schooler and Hertwig, 2005) is one possible 
mechanism by which (consciously) unrecognized objects may gain 
preference through repeated exposure (and the same process may 
also apply to inferences between unrecognized objects).
In a direct test of the recognition heuristic in preference judg-
ments, Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) first taught 
participants information about various brands (e.g., “Ecover has 
been engaging in animal testing.”) and then asked them whether 
they would rather pick a product (e.g., shower gel) of a recognized 
brand – for which they had learned additional knowledge – or a 
product of an unrecognized brand. The authors concluded that 
recognition had a large influence on the preferences, but a large 
majority of participants also considered the taught knowledge. In 
fact, however, it is rather unclear what these findings mean for the 
recognition heuristic. As in most studies on the recognition heuris-
tic, Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) tested no alterative 
model. So although participants sometimes did not rely on the 
recognition heuristic, it may still provide the best available model 
for the observed data. In addition, the taught knowledge about the 
brands concerned information about the ethical standards of the 
brands, which might receive special attention compared to more 
common product information. Due to these methodological prob-
lems, we still know relatively little about the role of the recognition 
heuristic in consumer preferences. In fact, several authors have 
about the recognition heuristic, however, is its precise account of 
the process involved in making an inference. The purpose of this 
connection is to highlight how research on the recognition heuristic 
could inspire novel questions in the study of these phenomena and 
to demonstrate that the special status of recognition may pervade 
decision making more generally.
InFerences about the truth oF a statement
A common inference problem in the real world is to judge whether 
a statement encountered is correct or false. What is the role of 
recognition, or more generally memory traces created by previ-
ous encounters with a statement, when making such inferences? 
Hasher et al. (1977) presented participants, over a period of 3 weeks, 
with statements that were either true or false (e.g., “the People’s 
Republic of China was founded in 1947”). Most of the statements 
appeared only once, but some were presented repeatedly across the 
three sessions. Hasher et al. (1977) found that when participants 
subsequently indicated their confidence that a statement was true, 
they expressed an increasing confidence in the veracity of a state-
ment the more frequently it was repeated. This reiteration effect (or 
frequency–validity effect) can be taken to indicate that participants 
used the strength of the memory traces of the statements as an 
indication of how likely the statement was to be true.
The reiteration effect is closely related to findings by Gilbert and 
colleagues, who presented their participants with a series of state-
ments followed by information as to whether each statement was 
true or false (Gilbert et al., 1990, 1993; Gilbert, 1991; but see Hasson 
et al., 2005). When participants had an uncertain basis for assessing 
the statement’s veracity (e.g., because they were distracted during 
processing; Gilbert et al., 1990), participants showed a stronger 
tendency to misclassify a previously seen false statement as true 
than to misclassify a true statement as false. In contrast, previously 
unseen statements were often classified as false. So even single previ-
ous encounters may be used by people to infer something about a 
statement, namely, that it is true. Although this default to believe a 
previously seen statement can be overturned, making such a switch 
appears to require additional cognitive resources: when under time 
pressure or cognitive load, participants tended to treat as true even 
statements they were previously informed were false (Gilbert et al., 
1993). This parallels the finding for the recognition heuristic that 
under time pressure people tend to ascribe recognized objects a 
higher criterion value than unrecognized objects even when rec-
ognition is a poor cue (Pachur and Hertwig, 2006). Interestingly, 
Gilbert et al. (1990) also mentioned that the initial belief in the 
truth of statements that one encounters “may be economical and…
adaptive” (p. 612), thus offering a potential link to the concept of 
ecological rationality. Finally, in parallel with McCloy et al.’s (2010) 
demonstration of framing effects in recognition-based inference 
(see above), Gilbert (1991) argued that “acceptance is psychologi-
cally prior” to rejection of the truth of a statement (p. 116).
estImatIon
The decisions considered so far involved categorical judgments about 
the environment, such as, which is larger: A or B? Is the statement 
X true or false? But often we have to make an absolute estimate 
regarding some aspect of an object and come up with a numerical 
value (e.g., the number of inhabitants of a city). Is information about 
5A similar observation was made by Pachur and Hertwig (2006): in an estimation 
task, people assigned unrecognized diseases to intermediate, rather than extremely 
low, frequency categories.
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